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ABSTRACT 
 
Cyber-infrastructure is at the heart of power system operations 
and is critical for maintaining reliable and stable power supply.  The 
advent of smart grid technology will undoubtedly increase the 
exposure and potential avenues of cyber attack well into the 
future.  The industry standard of contingency analysis largely 
focuses on accidental outages, such as natural disasters, 
equipment malfunction, etc. Intentional, directed attacks and cyber 
components are not well understood or accounted for.   
 
In response, the Security-Oriented Cyber-Physical Contingency 
Analysis (SOCCA) framework demonstrates that it is both prudent 
and practical to assess the impact of cyber events within power 
infrastructures.  Using a new formalism to model cyber-physical 
interconnections and by ranking contingencies based on impact 
and attack complexity, SOCCA presents system operators with a 
detailed vulnerability landscape of their networks. SOCCA’s 
contingency ranking algorithm relies heavily on Markov Decision 
Processes. These MDPs require expert knowledge in determining 
the attack surface and gauging the likelihood of an attack’s success 
as represented by a probability.  The choice of reward function and 
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assignment of probabilities greatly influence the behavior of the 
MDP.  Therefore, the accuracy of the ranking algorithm is called 
into question as it is intrinsically tied to the accuracy of the expert 
knowledge.   
 
This thesis aims to identify the major factors that affect the 
contingency ranking in an MDP model that represents an industry-
standard cyber-physical power network.  Probability assignments 
will be varied including augmenting the SOCCA framework in order 
to extend the probabilities associated with the MDPs to be bounded 
intervals rather than exact values. This way, reliance on precise 
expert knowledge is lessened and sensitivity analysis can be 
performed to provide a confidence rating to the contingency 
analysis. This will also give insight into how modifying or mitigating 
certain attack steps contributes to the overall cyber security state 
of the network. 
  
iv 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
The author wishes to extend his utmost gratitude to Professor 
Rakesh Bobba for his continuous support and sagacious advice 
over the last 18 months.  It has truly been a pleasure and a 
privilege to work alongside you.  Special thanks to Professor 
Saman Zonouz and Luis Garcia from the University of Miami for 
their technical expertise and assistance in code development.  
Thanks also to Kate & Matt Davis from the PowerWorld Corporation 
for providing key knowledge of power simulation and power 
networks.  Last but not least, many thanks to Dr. Masooda Bashir, 
Syed Faisal Hasan and the rest of the ICSSP family for not only 
funding to complete my graduate degree,  but for the 
encouragement, excitement, and inspiration along the way. 
 
  
v 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ......................................................... 1 
    1.1    THE SOCCA FRAMEWORK ................................................. 2 
    1.2    MARKOV DECISION PROCESSES ....................................... 5 
    1.3    OVERVIEW ..................................................................... 9 
    1.4    FIGURES ...................................................................... 10 
CHAPTER 2: RELATED WORK ....................................................... 11 
CHAPTER 3: MODEL CREATION ................................................... 14 
    3.1    THE PHYSICAL POWER NETWORK .................................... 14 
    3.2    THE CYBER CONTROL NETWORK ..................................... 15 
    3.3    CREATION OF THE MARKOV DECISION PROCESS .............. 16 
    3.4    PROBABILITY TRANSITION ASSIGNMENT ......................... 17 
    3.5    FIGURES ...................................................................... 18 
CHAPTER 4: EXPERIMENTATION AND RESULTS ............................. 22 
    4.1    INTERVAL VALUE ITERATION .......................................... 23 
    4.2    CONTINGENCY RANKING ................................................ 24 
    4.3    EXPERIMENTS ............................................................... 25 
    4.4    FIGURES ...................................................................... 30 
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS ........................................................ 34 
    5.1    FUTURE WORK .............................................................. 35 
REFERENCES ............................................................................. 37 
APPENDIX A: INTERVAL VALUE ITERATION ALGORITHM .......... 39 
 
1 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Called mankind’s biggest and most complex machine, the modern 
electric power grid is a myriad of aging technologies and ad-hoc 
solutions. Assessing the cyber threat landscape of this most critical 
asset is vital in ensuring its reliability and the continued delivery of 
the nation’s essential services.  Traditional state estimation in the 
power grid refers to analyzing data from a distributed network of 
sensors connected to power components and communicated 
through SCADA or similar technologies [1].  These sensors operate 
on line voltages, current, phase angle and discrete measurable 
electricity phenomena.  
 
This implies that the behavior of the system can be accurately 
predicted using power flow equations, using numerical methods 
largely based on the Newton-Raphson method [2]. This allows 
power companies to plan for and mitigate the damage caused by 
disruptive events during operation and know the state of the 
system of all times.  This usually manifests itself as ‘N – 1’ 
contingency analysis [3], where the loss of a generator or 
transmission component is simulated and system operators make 
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adjustments to re-route power as necessary. NERC standards 
require such capability.  
 
However, as smart grid technology continually pushes its way into 
the electric sector, the industry can no longer rely on purely 
physical numerical methods to guarantee reliability.  Promising big 
improvements in energy efficiency and benefits to utilities and 
consumers, computer automation of the grid also ensures 
increased exposure to the risk of outages from cyber threats.  
Internet-ready smart meters under consumer control, distributed 
generation and energy storage, and GPS-enabled phasor 
measurement units are just a few examples of how the cyber 
attack landscape may grow unabated for many years to come.  
 
1.1 The SOCCA Framework 
In order to address the need to incorporate cyber-physical 
interconnections into power grid contingency analysis, Zonouz et 
al. presented SOCCA: A Security-Oriented Cyber-Physical 
Contingency Analysis in Power Infrastructures [4].  First, SOCCA 
uses offline discovery to map the cyber control network.  An XML 
document was created to describe the topology and network access 
policies / firewall rules.  Using the NetAPT tool [5], a connectivity 
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matrix is created using the topology and access policies that 
reflects possible workflows through the network as a directed 
graph.  In the future, this could be done in a dynamic, online 
manner using tools such as nmap, Nessus, etc.  
 
The power component network is handled by the Power World 
Simulator [6], which performs power flow contingency analysis to 
determine component failures that would result in an outage.  The 
interconnections between the cyber control network and the power 
component network are then added.  This is typically a breaker 
connected to a relay, which is handled by a front end processer in 
the control network.  Using the complete directed connectivity 
graph, SOCCA generates a Markov Decision Process [7] model that 
seeks to enumerate the paths an attacker might take in securing 
resources and privileges in an attempt to cause line outages. 
 
For each set of privileges that an attacker may possess, a unique 
state is given in the MDP. Using the Power World simulation, each 
state is granted a performance index, which signifies the outage 
severity associated with disruption of the network components 
governed by those privileges.  Next, using value iteration, a 
security index for each state is calculated using the performance 
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index (impact) with the probability that the attacker will succeed in 
gaining the state’s privileges from cyber attack.  These probabilities 
are, at best, speculative and based on expert knowledge or 
experience.  Adding mitigation schemes and network defenses 
likely serve to lower the likelihood of success, but it is hard to 
evaluate by how much this will change.  An attacker may also 
discover a novel approach to infiltration that renders defenses 
ineffective or take advantage of social engineering and phishing to 
achieve his/her goals.  It becomes crucial when assessing critical 
assets and contingencies to know how sensitive the model is to 
likelihood metrics. 
 
Once the value iteration is complete, the attacker’s possible actions 
are ranked according to the optimal route the attacker can take to 
cause disruption.  Because the MDP value iteration algorithm 
incorporates all future actions into the analysis, ranking is 
accomplished by simply choosing the action with highest security 
index from the attacker’s available actions given the set of 
privileges he/she has attained.  It is important to note that as new 
information comes in regarding cyber events as reported by 
intrusion detection systems or other network monitoring, SOCCA 
can be run in real-time to re-evaluate from any point in the MDP 
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using the attacker’s current position as the base point.  This is 
helpful as the network grows and scales and performance 
constraints limit the ability to generate and evaluate the entire 
MDP at once.  Instead, the contingency analysis will be limited to a 
given horizon. 
 
Using the contingency rankings generated by the MDP, a system 
operator has good knowledge of the most crucial assets on his 
system and which intrusions are the most important to prevent 
against at varying stages of network operation.  Tools that work in 
real-time and report early are vital due to timing deadlines 
inherent to power infrastructure.  System operators typically know 
their options to re-route power in the event of a failure, and they 
can use the same tactics in the event of a cyber attack. 
 
1.2 Markov Decision Processes 
It is important to understand the manner in which MDPs model 
decision-making scenarios to give the results of the contingency 
analysis clear meaning. A Markov Decision Process [7] is a tuple 
(S, A, Pa(s,s’), R(s)) where S is a finite set of states, A is a finite 
set of actions, P is a probability transition function that reflects the 
likelihood that given an action a taken from state s, the system 
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changes to state s’, and R is the expected reward gained from for 
achieving state s. Since S and A are finite, an MDP of this type is 
referred to as a discrete Markov decision process. 
 
For the purposes of this thesis, the MDP is modeled after the 
SOCCA framework [4].  The state space S is the security state of 
the cyber-power network, meaning that each state is a potential 
set of privileges that an attacker has gained through infiltration.  A 
privilege in this sense is defined as control over a network host or 
power component.  For each new node in the network that an 
attacker controls, he/she is said to have extended the current set 
of privileges and the MDP transitions to a new state. The attacker 
initially has no privileges in the network and is seen as a user on 
the open Internet.  
 
The action space A represents the attacker’s choices as he/she 
explores the security state space of the system.  Given the current 
set of privileges, any directed connectivity to another node that an 
attacker could potentially exploit is assigned an action that 
transitions to a new state of privileges including the exploited 
node.  Taking an action can result in two possibilities. An attacker 
is either successful at exploiting the node and gains the new 
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privilege with probability p or fails to execute the attack and 
remains at his/her current state with probability (1-p). These 
probabilities are what define P.  An example MDP is shown in 
Figure 1 [4].  
 
Lastly, R, the reward function, reflects how transitioning from 
states in the MDP serves the attacker’s goals.  In this case, the 
attacker’s goal is characterized as causing as many line outages as 
he/she can.  For each state s, 
 
 
which says that for every power line l, calculate the flow on that 
line divided by the maximum flow permitted on that line and if 
there is a line flow violation, assign a positive value. Otherwise, 
assign 0.  If the security state of the system s contains privileges 
for components that directly control flow on power lines, it is 
assumed that the attacker compromises those lines and switches 
them off.  The flow of power under each set of outages is 
calculated within the Power World Simulator. 
 
Once the MDP has been properly filled, it is ready to find the 
optimal policy for the decision maker.  A policy, denoted ∏(s), is 
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the choice of action that the decision maker takes while at state s. 
The decision maker here is the attacker.  To achieve this, the 
dynamic programming algorithm called value iteration is used.   
For value iteration, a value function V(s) is defined that gives each 
state s a value v so that it can be compared amongst other states.  
This differs from the reward function in that it mixes the reward 
gained at a state with the probability of reaching that state as well 
as the future rewards of states available after reaching s. V(s) is 
defined as follows: 
 
 
 
Here gamma represents the discount factor, which accounts for the 
diminished return of rewards that are far away from the current 
state.  As a dynamic programming algorithm, V(s) is recalculated 
for every state iteratively until the sum of change across all states 
falls within some low value.  The value used in this thesis was 10-3. 
Once values have been calculated for all states, the optimal policy 
for the attacker to take is the action that would lead to the state of 
highest value from the current state.  Additionally, for the system 
operator, these actions are the most important to protect and 
prevent from occurring.  
9 
 
1.3 Overview 
From here, Chapter 2 will review the body of research related to 
cyber contingency analysis in power networks and how it compares 
to the methods discussed here.  Chapter 3 will examine the 
creation of the cyber-physical power network model and 
justification for why it is an appropriate representation of modern 
power infrastructure.  It will also dive into the parameters that 
were assigned to the corresponding MDP.  Chapter 4 discusses the 
methods used to evaluate the dominating factors that affect the 
contingency ranking and the results of employing those methods.  
Chapter 5 will draw conclusions about the findings from Chapter 4 
and make considerations for analyses to be done in the future.  
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1.4 Figures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: An Example Power Control Network and MDP 
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CHAPTER 2: RELATED WORK 
 
Although contingency analysis of the power grid has been studied 
for many decades, only recently have concerted efforts been 
carried out to incorporate cyber contingencies and their effects into 
the mix.  Chen et al. [8] propose a stochastic Petri net approach to 
model coordinated cyber-physical attacks on the smart grid.  Using 
a hierarchical method of constructing small Petri nets from specific 
domain experts, a large Petri net is compiled to represent the 
system as a whole.  The authors admit that there is a great deal of 
manual effort and expertise required for an accurate model.  
Additionally, their method focuses on modeling specific attack 
scenarios such as a smart meter compromise.  By shifting focus to 
the effects of a generic compromise and gauging the impact of the 
expert knowledge, this research hopes to overcome these 
limitations.  
 
Research has also been performed that seeks to advance dynamic 
detection of network compromise and measurement corruption in a 
power network [9].  While detection is important in its own right, 
and the authors make good effort to account for unexpected or 
unknown attacks, their method is complex and intrinsically tied to 
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a power system state that in reality, morphs and grows constantly.  
Reevaluation of contingencies in real-time is incredibly important 
for system operators and focus should be reallocated towards 
enumeration of key assets and not so heavily on types of attacks.   
 
Sridhar et al. present a detailed overview of cyber security tasks 
relevant to the power grid domain.  While presented at a high-
level, the risk assessment methodology explained within contains 
many vital activities that collectively serve to professionally 
coordinate cyber defense within the power infrastructure.  The 
SOCCA framework would be an essential contribution to the 
infrastructure vulnerability analysis within the broader scope of 
complete cyber-physical system security.  As the paper states, grid 
security must be continually analyzed with respect to complexity, 
long lifespans, and novel attack vectors.  At this time, no other 
contingency analysis offers the same real-time, scalable protection 
benefits. 
 
In terms of perturbation analysis of MDPs, different approaches 
were considered.  [10-12] show examples of methods that have 
been proposed to handle sensitivity of steady-state performance of 
Markov processes. The approach deemed most closely related to 
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the problem description at the time of writing is [13], which among 
other things, contributes a novel value iteration algorithm that 
allows transition probabilities within an MDP to be treated as a 
bounded real interval instead of an exact value.  This algorithm will 
be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4. 
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 CHAPTER 3: MODEL CREATION 
 
Every network and corresponding system model will have 
significant differences, even within domain-specific applications.  
Power networks come in all shapes and sizes, governed by the area 
of distribution they serve, types of equipment in use, utility-specific 
policies, and legacy issues.  Therefore, when advising utilities on 
the security state of their networks or providing tools to system 
operators, it is imperative that the model formalism makes sense 
and emulates reality.  There is no perfect generalization or 
analogous model for every single network and it can make drawing 
meaningful conclusions difficult in a research setting.  This chapter 
will highlight how the example model was chosen and make a case 
for having general value to the industry at large. 
 
3.1 The Physical Power Network 
When performing cyber-physical contingency analysis and system 
monitoring, scope must be sufficiently limited so that the system 
does not become overburdened. Quick decision making makes all 
the difference in guarding against intentional attacks.  That being 
said, a power network was chosen to reflect the typical granularity 
at which monitoring is performed – the substation or a small 
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collections of substations. The simulated power grid infrastructure 
chosen was the IEEE 24-bus reliability test system [14].  This test 
system fully describes generation and transmission network, 
complete with load constraints, ratings, and reliability data.  It 
was, in fact, created in order to sufficiently describe a broad range 
of power networks and was created by a committee of industry 
professionals well-versed in real implementations.  A diagram of 
the 24-bus system is shown in Figure 2.  The system consists of 32 
generation units and 24 load/generation buses connected by 38 
transmission lines along with full descriptions of peak load 
conditions, generation capability, and energy output.  This data 
was directly entered into a Power World simulation in order to 
calculate highly accurate line flows. 
 
3.2 The Cyber Control Network 
As for the cyber control network, there are no peer-reviewed and 
standard models for the IT infrastructure necessary to coordinate 
and monitor a power network.  In the culture of cyber security 
awareness that we live in, it is unlikely that any utility would step 
forward to expose the inner workings of their network willingly to 
the general public.  In place of a standard representation, an 
example of a control network was constructed from conversations 
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with local professionals in the industry and based on a real network 
that was kept confidential.  On their recommendations, the cyber 
control network was made to fit with the 24-bus power network.  T 
 
The cyber control network consists of 59 host systems and firewalls 
and monitors the buses in the 24-bus model.  Each bus is 
controlled by a single host in the control network.  Inspection of 
the cyber control network reveals 10 key assets that affect the 
cyber-physical interconnection and can result in line outages.  
Figure 3 shows the cyber control network topology. 
 
3.3 Creation of the Markov Decision Process 
Since there are 10 key assets that an attacker would seek 
privileged access to in order to achieve his/her goals, states are 
created in the MDP that reflect collection of those 10 privileges.  
Since the assets must be achieved somewhat sequentially, there 
are 146 resultant states instead of all possible permutations of the 
10 privileges.  As described above, the SOCCA framework uses the 
connectivity matrix and access policy rules to determine the 
possible actions from each state. The calculation of the reward 
function has already been discussed. Figure 4 is a directed graph 
showing the entire MDP.  The top number at each state is the ID of 
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that state, the middle is the state’s performance index or reward 
value, and the bottom number is the state’s security index, the 
result of value iteration.  States depicted white contain cyber 
privileges only while grey states are those that contain physical 
privileges as well.  A mapping from state ID’s to control network 
hosts is included in Table 1. 
 
3.4 Probability Transition Assignment 
The final piece of the puzzle for the MDP model is how to assign 
transition probabilities to the actions between states.  For cyber 
components, this is almost always set according to domain 
expertise or security professional advice, as has been a recurring 
theme throughout this writing.  Since this research seeks to 
determine the importance of accurate expertise on the overall 
contingency ranking, probabilities will instead be assigned 
randomly and results will be compared.  However, for states in the 
MDP that reflect having direct control over a power component 
through the required set of privileges to get access, probability 
transitions are set to 1.  For example, if the attacker gains control 
of a relay, it is then trivial to open a breaker and cause an outage.  
There is virtually no mitigation possible between those two events. 
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3.5 Figures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The IEEE 24-bus Reliability Test System   
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Figure 3: Simulated Cyber Control Network 
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CHAPTER 4: EXPERIMENTATION & RESULTS 
 
The body of work related to cyber-physical contingency analysis for 
power grids always circles back to the requirement of expert 
domain knowledge and security knowhow.  By nature, it is a 
tedious and manual process that requires large resources and the 
benefits are often undermined by the cost.  In an MDP model such 
as this, expertise manifests itself as transition probabilities.  
Therefore, it is the goal of these experiments to perturb the 
probabilities assigned to states in the model to determine the 
importance of and sensitivity to prior knowledge of the attack 
surface.  This will be accomplished by assigning a base value to the 
transitions in the model as if they were determined by an expert 
and calculating the security index (value function) accordingly.  
These probabilities will be chosen randomly out of a set of three 
possibilities, representing low, medium, and high likelihood of 
exploitation.  These exact values will be 0.2, 0.4, and 0.6 
respectively.  Once these probabilities have been randomly 
distributed, the value of each state will be locked in as the base 
value.  Perturbations of the probabilities thereafter should cause 
changes in the value functions of the MDP states compared to the 
base values.  The change in value of states will be assessed 
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empirically as well as any change in the contingency ranking 
results from the base values.  In this way, the results will show 
whether transition probabilities in a MDP modeled after a real 
power network are highly sensitive to accurate expert analysis or if 
other factors in the MDP dominate the ranking. 
 
4.1 Interval Value Iteration 
At the core of the sensitivity analysis is the Interval Value Iteration 
(IVI) algorithm [13].  Where traditional MDPs require an exact 
value for the transition probability function, IVI provides the ability 
to specify a real interval for each action’s likelihood.  This is an 
ideal tool for perturbation because it allows for testing the entire 
range of probabilities within a given ∆p.  By testing all probabilities 
simultaneously, effectively all possible permutations of an MDP, an 
uncountable amount, are tested in polynomial time.  This is 
incredibly powerful.  The authors show that there is a finite set of 
MDPs that are of interest.  Particularly, given an ordering of all the 
states in the MDP, there is a unique MDP that sends as much 
probability mass as possible early in the ordering.  We will defer to 
the publication for proofs of order-maximizing MDPs and 
convergence.  As expected, IVI gives a real interval as a result for 
a state’s value function.  In fact, it gives optimal policy value 
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intervals.  There are perhaps more sophisticated ways to compare 
these intervals, but for this study, value intervals were compared 
by their midpoint to determine ranking. Pseudo-code of IVI can be 
found in Appendix A. 
 
4.2 Contingency Ranking 
The primary way to evaluate whether or not a perturbation of the 
MDP’s probability transition function creates meaningful results is 
to enumerate the highest ranking contingencies (states with 
highest value function) and look for changes.  In other words, does 
the attacker’s optimal policy change if a different transition 
function is introduced?  Because the attacker is assumed to start 
outside the network without any privileges, we rank contingencies 
based on optimal actions from the root.  In breadth-first fashion, 
all actions are enumerated from the root state and the top action is 
ranked #1.  From here, we continue considering the remaining 
actions from the root state, but we now include all actions 
reachable from the state in which the system would result if the 
attacker successfully transitioned from the top contingency.  One 
contingency is ranked per iteration and any new actions reachable 
given that contingency is taken are added to the list to be ranked.  
This is a slight break from the algorithm presented in the SOCCA 
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paper, which ranked all contingencies available before considering 
the next hop.  This continues until all states have been reached 
and the resulting list is the optimal policy for the attacker.  The 
attacker should take actions in the order listed to maximize the 
reward, in our case, line outages.  Conversely, a system operator 
should prioritize protecting against actions in the list in order to 
thwart the attacker most effectively.  It should be noted that only 
cyber contingencies are to be ranked since it is assumed that 
power contingencies have no option for mitigation and transition 
with probability 1.  To reiterate, the white nodes in the MDP 
diagram (Figure 4) refer to cyber states while grey nodes denote 
power states. 
 
4.3 Experiments 
Recall that the following experiments were perturbations compared 
against a base value assigned to states as if an expert has set their 
probability transition functions.  All graphs are located in the 
Figures subsection of this chapter. 
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4.3.1 Perturbation of the Base Values 
The first experiment conducted was to employ IVI to introduce a ∆p 
for each state’s probability function.  As the interval is increased 
outward from the base probability, the possible values associated 
with the states should significantly change if the probabilities are a 
dominating factor in the MDP.  To test this, the top 10 contingency 
rankings were compared for each increase in ∆p.  Additionally, the 
value intervals returned by IVI in each case were compared and 
the percent change in value for every state was calculated.  The 
maximum difference of either the interval’s lower bound or upper 
bound from the base value was chosen for the percent change.  
This data shows how a change in probability directly affects a 
state’s value.  An example data set from one iteration of testing is 
displayed in Table 2.  
 
After carrying out the tests, a surprising result emerged.  
Increasing the range of probabilities for all states by as much as .3 
in either direction caused no change in the contingency rankings at 
all.  Neither the ordering nor the set of contingencies in the top 10 
changed at all.  Figure 5 shows the average percent difference in 
value for all states for a given ∆p along with the standard 
deviation.  This data set is delimited as ‘linear’ because the relation 
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between states with different probability transitions is linear due to 
the base probabilities being 0.2, 0.4, and 0.6. 
 
4.3.2 Perturbing the Probability Relation 
Since no changes were detected in the previous experiment, the 
next thing to test is the relative relationship between the different 
probability transition functions.  Whereas the probabilities were 
linearly related before, an exponential relationship was tried. In 
place of 0.2, 0.4, and 0.6 the new corresponding initial probabilities 
were set to 0.1, 0.2, and 0.8.  Again testing for different values of 
∆p using IVI, the top 10 rankings were compared to the base 
rankings and percent change was calculated similarly as before in 
Figure 6.  Please note that base rankings in this context refer to 
the rankings before any experiments were run, not the beginning 
of the current experiment. 
 
This time, 9 out of the top 10 rankings were different compared to 
the base rankings.  However, across all ∆p using the exponential 
relationship, there was no change in rankings.  This is still a 
significant change and reflects an entirely different policy that an 
optimal attacker would pursue.  Therefore, the relationship 
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amongst probability values is an important consideration when 
constructing the MDP. 
 
4.3.3 Reassigning the Original Probabilities 
Another test that was deemed necessary was to detect changes if a 
whole other assignment of probabilities was given.  The base 
probabilities were assigned randomly out of 0.2, 0.4, and 0.6.  For 
this test, those probabilities were again randomly distributed 
across all states in a guaranteed unique way from the base 
assignments.  Once more, IVI was utilized to test over increasing 
values of ∆p. The top 10 rankings were again computed and 
percent change of value functions are given in Figure 7. 
 
Similar to the first experiment, there was no change in the 
rankings compared to the base rankings across any ∆p.  Even 
though the probabilities were scrambled and reordered, there was 
no consequential change in the MDP’s optimal policy.  The 
probabilities within states have a linear relationship as in 
Experiment 1 so perhaps this is additional evidence for the 
importance of the relative difference between probability 
transitions instead of their placement in the MDP. 
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4.3.4 Perturbing the Discount Factor 
The probability transition function is only one aspect that governs 
the optimal MDP policy.  Another variable that may affect change is 
the discount factor within the value iteration. The discount factor is 
responsible for diminishing greater rewards that require many 
actions to attain versus smaller rewards that are more easily within 
reach.  IVI was not used in this test.  Instead, the original base 
probabilities were left constant and the discount factor was varied 
intermittently between .2 and .9. The base value iteration 
algorithm used a discount factor of 0.7.  Percent change from the 
base values were again calculated and are included in Figure 8. 
 
Despite seeing the greatest change in the values of states and the 
widest standard deviation, perturbing the discount factor did not 
change the top 10 contingency rankings in any way.   
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4.4 Figures 
State  Base Value V↓(s)  V↑(s) ∆max % Change 
1   2.91 2.21 3.32 0.704 0.242 
2   3.39 2.72 3.61 0.67 0.198 
3   5.8 5.05 5.82 0.748 0.129 
4   2.98 1.62 3.53 1.36 0.456 
5   9.38 8.57 8.57 0.811 0.0864 
6   8.57 7.41 7.41 1.16 0.135 
7   8.57 7.41 7.41 1.16 0.135 
8   7.41 5.75 5.75 1.66 0.224 
9   5.75 3.38 3.38 2.37 0.412 
10   7.41 5.75 5.75 1.66 0.224 
11   8.57 7.41 7.41 1.16 0.135 
12   7.41 5.75 5.75 1.66 0.224 
13   9.95 9.38 9.38 0.569 0.0571 
14   9.38 8.57 8.57 0.811 0.0864 
15   9.38 8.57 8.57 0.811 0.0864 
16   8.57 7.41 7.41 1.16 0.135 
17   7.41 5.75 5.75 1.66 0.224 
18   8.57 7.41 7.41 1.16 0.135 
19   9.38 8.57 8.57 0.811 0.0864 
20   8.57 7.41 7.41 1.16 0.135 
21   9.95 9.38 9.38 0.569 0.0571 
22   5.47 4.61 5.32 0.856 0.156 
23   4.14 3.05 3.99 1.09 0.263 
24   8.57 7.41 7.41 1.16 0.135 
25   7.41 5.75 5.75 1.66 0.224 
26   4.32 3.1 3.57 1.22 0.283 
27   9.38 8.57 8.57 0.811 0.0864 
28   8.57 7.41 7.41 1.16 0.135 
29   5 3.99 4.6 1.01 0.202 
30   5.47 4.61 5.32 0.856 0.156 
…   … … … … … 
 
 
 
  
Table 2:  Example Data Set from Experiment 1 
∆p = .1 
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Top 10 Base Contingency Rankings 
  
 
  
Start State End State  V(s) 
0 74 4.99 
74 101 10.34 
74 125 10.34 
101 28 9.94 
101 77 9.94 
101 102 9.94 
101 111 9.94 
101 119 9.94 
28 4 9.38 
77 4 9.94 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Top 10 Contingency Ranking Changes vs. Base 
  
    
  
Across all Linear 
  
0 
  
    
  
From Base to Exponential 
 
9 
Across All Exponential 
  
0 
  
    
  
From Base to Shuffled Linear 
 
0 
Across All Shuffled 
  
0 
  
    
  
Across All Change in Discount Factor   0 
  
Table 3 
 
Table 4 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS 
 
Towards the objective of evaluating the sensitivity of a prototypical 
power network MDP to the effects of probability transitions, the 
results show conclusive evidence that the role of expert knowledge 
is not as integral to contingency ranking as previously thought.  
Despite augmenting the security index of MDP states by as much 
as 130% on average with standard deviation approaching the 
average itself, contingency rankings were shown to not be affected 
at all.  The discount factor of value iteration was also determined 
to be inconsequential albeit being the most influential in terms of 
value change.  The only noticed change in contingency rankings 
occurred when greater disparity was placed in the relative values of 
available probability transitions, though the placement of the 
transitions themselves seems insignificant.   
 
This seems to imply that the native structure of a power network is 
governed by the only remaining variable, the assignment of 
rewards amongst states.  This is reasonable when considering that 
power control networks are typically structured such that there are 
only a few hops between the outside Internet and components that 
directly affect line flow.  This is also in keeping with the radial 
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topology of the control network.  If the initial few hops are 
breached, the inner workings of the network are open to 
exploration and exploit.  Therefore, it is imperative to maintain a 
strong outer shell and place defense mechanisms early in the 
attack chain.  Deriving the most vulnerable assets is an ongoing 
problem, but it seems that focus ought to be shifted towards 
accurate reward functions and broad probability transition schemes 
in place of individual probability scrutiny in the scope of MDP 
modeling. 
 
5.1 Future Work 
Going forward with this reasoning, it seems prudent to perform 
experiments using varying reward functions to identify the most 
accurate measure of contingency ranking.  Additionally, the 
incorporation of negative rewards for attack failures may provide 
additional insight into the behavior of the system.  Furthermore, 
probability transition functions that model tight exterior mitigation 
may be equally interesting. 
 
As for extension of the SOCCA framework into the future, alert 
correlation may provide an avenue to enable real-time threat 
monitoring and contingency warnings.  Works such as [15] present 
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novel approaches to alert correlation through attack trees.  By 
mapping intrusion detection or other network management alerts 
to assets in an attack chain as we have demonstrated using MDPs, 
the current state of the network can be approximated in good 
confidence and re-evaluation of contingencies can take place 
quickly and responsively.  A working prototype of this type of 
analysis has been discussed and implemented in a related work to 
SOCCA called SCPSE [16].  
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APPENDIX A: INTERVAL VALUE ITERATION ALGORITHM 
 
 
Figure 9: Pseudo-code of the IVI algorithm [13] 
 
